NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 39 AND THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA * by Edgar Lockwood
For observers of U.S. policy toward Africa, this has been the fall of the "Nissem."
Newspaper and magazine articles by Tad Szulc and Jack Anderson, based on the text of National Security Study Memorandum 39 of 1969 (NSSM 39), have popularized an alleged Nixon "tilt" toward Southern Africa's white regimes, stemming from a preference for protection of U.S. economic interests over ideals of democracy and decency.' The State Department, embarrassed and flustered by the leak of another secret document, has tried to downplay its significance (calling it merely a preliminary study), and has disclaimed any change in policy. 2 For some, the revelations contained in NSSM 39 simply confirmed old news. As early as 1970, Ken Owen, the Washington representative of South Africa's Argus news chain, had been summoned to the White House and asked to convey a message to Pretoria via his column: the White House was anxious to improve relations with South Africa and was there fore refraining from condemnation of South Africa's denial of a visa for Arthur Ashe as a sign of a shift in policy. 3 In September 1970, Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom had, in a Chicago speech, signalled South Africa that the U.S. would be prepared to accept license applications for sales of VIP jet planes to South Africa's military, indicating a new flexibility in the U.S. arms embargo. 4 Two years later, Terrence Smith of the New York Times had analyzed the new policy of "dialogue." By early 1973, Chairman Diggs of the House Subcommittee on Africa was openly referring to NSSM 39 as the memorandum that had "launched the so-called communication policy." What is new of late is that a wide range of people outside the Administration have recently had access to the text of the memorandum itself. The significance of the NSSM lies in the glimpse it affords of Kissinger's realpolitik analysis, unadorned by rhetoric and devoid of charisma. The basic considerations and posture there set forth indicate what we can expect between now and at least 1976. A more exact analysis of the document's contents and of the actions flowing from it is thus justified.
In April 1969, Kissinger directed the preparation of a com prehensive review of U.S. policy toward Southern Africa by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa-composed primarily of representatives of the State Department, the Department of Defense and the CIA. Treasury, Commerce, Joint Chiefs of Staff, AID and NASA would add their special knowledge. The study was to cover the history and the future of major area problems, U.S. interests and options for strategy and policy. The emphasis was to be on broadening the range of views and presenting alternatives.
In August, the 70-page memorandum was presented to Kissinger. It was then redrafted in ways not affecting most of its substance and presented to the National Security Council on December 9th. 6 The Council's view was that the U.S.
should to some degree "straddle" the racial conflict which it saw building-with an emphasis on relaxing previous "arbi trary" limitations on U.S. interests-and should adopt a less moralistic, admonishing tone toward the white states. Kissinger therefore recommended to Nixon in January that the general outlines of "Option 2" of NSSM 39 be followed, and he spelled out what this choice would mean in a number of "Operational Examples." A careful reading of the five options of NSSM 39 makes it appear probable that Option 2 was favored by most of the participants in the survey. Its rationale was more detailed and its outline better fleshed out than are those of Options, 1, 3, 4, and 5. Option 3 is a codification of the policy inherited from the Kennedy and Johnson era, and Options 1,4, and 5 seem to have been provided for context and intellectual balance. Since all of the options represent varying combinations of U.S.
interests, we need to understand what the study defines as these interests.
U.S. interests in Southern Africa are seen as falling into four categories:
1. Political Politically conscious Blacks in Africa and else where resent "discrimination" against Blacks by white regimes. To the extent that the United States is seen as a collaborator with, or a tacit supporter of, the white regimes, black states may conclude that this country is racist both abroad and at home. Further, they may threaten U.S. defense installations, deny overflight rights and port facilities, and threaten U.S. economic interests. (At the time of the survey, U.S. trade with and investment in the black states of Africa was roughly 60 percent of all U.S. trade with and investment in the continent. 7 )
2. Economic. The study points out that investments in those African states controlled by Whites are highly profitable, that the balance of trade is favorable to the U.S. (1968: 1.8 to 1), and that South Africa's gold must be marketed in an orderly fashion in order to maintain the two-tier gold system.
3. Defense. The strategic value of the Southern area was seen to be "important" (but not "vital"), especially because of the closing of the Suez Canal and the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
Overflight and landing rights for military aircraft could become important in the event of Indian Ocean "contingen cies." South African ports can handle vessels of up to 100,000 tons and 45-foot draft, such as aircraft carriers, while Mozam bican and Angolan ports cannot. South Africa's ship repair and logistical facilities possess a level of technical skill not found elsewhere in Africa.
4. Scientific. The NASA space tracking facility in South Africa is seen to be of major value for unmanned spacecraft flights. The Atomic Energy Agreement with South Africa provides leverage to keep South Africa from marketing its rich uranium deposits so as to increase nuclear proliferation.
Since the pursuit and protection of all interests might involve contradiction inter se, a dilemma is presented. Is it possible to construct a policy which will improve U.S. standing with black states on the race issue while protecting our eco nomic, scientific, and strategic interests and opportunities in the white states-simultaneously cooling violence, encouraging white "moderation," and minimizing chances for the USSR and China to gain propaganda and political benefits?
While the foregoing definition of U.S. interests in Southern Africa was agreed upon, the study group disagreed on other major questions: Will violence in opposition to white rule increase? How much damage would pursuit of U.S. tangible interests in white states do to U.S. interests in black states? Can the U.S. have any real influence on the course of events in Southern Africa? Which interests are, ultimately, the more important ones?
Notwithstanding the differences over such points, certain extreme policy options are ruled out in the study. On the one hnd, our interests are not sufficiently large to justify U.S. fititary intervention to protect the white regimes. On the other, we could not endorse the racial or colonial policies of these regimes. Support for the positions of the black states could also go just so far. We would never agree to exclude South Africa or Portugal from the U.N., and we would not It could go all out not only to protect, but to increase economic, strategic, and scientific interests in the white-ruled countries-letting the chips fall where they might in the black states-on the ground that the U.S. is incapable of influencing white attitudes and po!icies anyway, and that the political costs would not be excessive. This is Option 1. Option l's polar opposite is Option 4. It says, in effect, let's buddy up to the black states and disassociate from the white regimes to enhance our standing on race, on the ground that violence is inevitable and that giving up our interests in the white states is not too costly because those interests are not vital.
Option 5 carries Option 4 one step further and is in essence a "Curse on Both Your Houses" policy. Racial conflict, which may escalate beyond any rational control or management, should be left to burn itself out without any U.S. intervention on either side.
These options seem constructed primarily as part of an intellectual game. The real work seems to have gone into the two compromise or straddle options, which give promise of deriving the most out of everything. Options 1, 4, and 5 are predicated on the proposition that we cannot influence the white regimes. Options 2 and 3 maintain that we can be instru mental in nudging the South Africans toward "majority rule." Until 1969, our policy had defined progress toward major ity rule in the white states as meaning:
1. "Non-whites" from the U.S. would be free of discrimina tion on naval shore leave, would participate in exchange programs and have access to non-white areas.
2. Elimination of job reservation, recognition of African trade unions as bargaining agents, abolition of pass laws and repressive police measures, and a qualified franchise.
3. Recognition of United Nations responsibility for Namibia and the cessation of repression there; withdrawal of South African economic and paramilitary support for Rhodesia; generous customs treatment for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland; and exceptions to apartheid for black sports men and businessmen.
Option 2 is built on a new acquiescence in the fundamental permanence and even desirability of South African power. Its key premise is that South Africa is and should be the domi nant power in thd area and that white rule there (and in the Portuguese colonies) is "here to stay." The outward thrust of South Africa to become accepted as a legitimate African state, to make itself available as a partner in black economic develop ment, and to create a whole nexus of economic interrelation ships with the states of the region provides a welcome oppor tunity for the United States. A closer relationship betweer South Africa and its black neighbors is seen to be the key to relaxation of tensions in the area, and thus to the protection Volume IV, Number 3, Fall 1974 of U.S. interests from the risks of instability arising from escalating violence. In order to accomplish this, the U.S. should work to encourage a closer relationship between the black and white states. By urging black states to concentrate on internal economic development, by giving them U.S. aid, and by encouraging South Africa to do the same, Option 2 envisages less support of armed struggle for the liberation of the white-ruled countries on the part of black states which realize that "peace and prosperity" lie in a closer relationship with South Africa. Communist powers will correspondingly lose influence. (It is interesting to.note that even in 1969 U.S. policymakers were aware of South Africa's overtures to its black neighbors, and of a response from Zambia and others.)
The authors of the memorandum are cognizant of the poli tical cost of Option 2. We will have to accept "political arrangements short of majority rule"; in fact, basic change is ruled out. The pro-Western leaders in the black states would have a tough time justifying relations with the United States. The Communist states would make hay out of the U.S. position, but this position provides a chance to expand our investments and trade while at least preserving our strategic, economic, and scientific interests.
Option 3, on the contrary, is built on the premise that South Africa should not be encouraged to become the Colossus of the South on the model of the U.S. relationship with Latin America. South Africa's outward thrust should be resisted wherever it increases South African domination of the black states. Option 3 creates no illusion that the white regimes will change because of U.S. policies, but it keeps this country's access to the black states relatively open, and keeps American options open to future developments: i.e., we can move closer to Blacks or closer to Whites depending on how things go. On the other hand, Option 3 hurts us with the Whites but does not really satisfy the Blacks, who want stronger action than we are prepared for. Both sides see the U.S. as a double-minded hypocrite, unwilling to make a choice between interests and political credibility in Southern Africa, whereas the previous Democratic Administrations had, according to the drafters of the study, taken a conspicuous lead in matters not of vital concern to the U.S.
These are the positions advanced in the five Options. How would they work out in practice? Each Option has a set of "Operational Examples" accompanying it. The key variables are: the arms embargo, investment and trade policies, sanc tions against Rhodesia, the United Nations and Namibia, and action and posture with respect to the insurgent movements.
At one extreme, Options 4 and 5 provide for strictest enforcement of the arms embargo against South Africa and Portugal, discouragement of investment and trade with the white states, expansion and enforcement of Rhodesian sanctions (Option 5, curiously, does provide a one-time exception for chrome importation), removal of tracking stations, and interdiction of the use of South African ports and airfields. At the other extreme, Option 1 provides for relaxation of the arms embargo to permit sales of dual purpose equipment and articles for common defense, encouragement of trade and facilitation of investment in South Africa and even in Namibia, relaxation of Rhodesian sanctions, and routine use of ports and airfields. Postures toward liberation groups range from public denunciations of their use of violence (Options 1, 2, and 5), to "discreet" contact (Option 3), open contact (Option 4), and open support for their aspirations (Option 4). In no case would material support be given except for assistance to individuals for humanitarian or educational purposes (Option 4).
Let us compare the most important Operational Examples of Option 2 with the actual historical record insofar as we can detect it. This analysis provides the clearest evidence that Option 2 was in fact selected as the basis of the policy imple mented by the Nixon Administration.
* Twelve Bell helicopters were sold for "telephone line inspection, harbor supervision, etc." Light aircraft were sold for "air taxi" service.
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No effective system of monitoring the real or "end" use was devised. Anyone who complained was forced to prove his case to government officials, and only the-latter had access to information necessary to prove a case. (Such information was denied to the complainant on grounds of commercial privilege.) Without the name of consignors and consignees and details of bills of lading, the complainant could not make a proper investigation even if the Portuguese had allowed field inspection by issuance of visas.
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We can conclude that the record of policy actions taken since 1969 conforms to Option 2 and its Operational Examples. The United States has moved oerceptibly closer to outright political support for southern Africa's white regimes. Indeed, its veto-with Great Britain and France-of the African states' resolution to exclude South Africa from the United Nations, and Ambassador Scali's attack in December 1974 on "unrealistic" General Assembly actions were public confirma tion of what was privately decided long ago. NSSM 39 makes it plain that force, sanctions, and exclusion of South Africa are all "unrealistic," and the United States is not now and never has been prepared to see them used as appropriate measures, even though it is admitted that basic change may not come without them.
The authors of NSSM 39, like most white Americans, have a hard time understanding, evaluating, or appreciating the depth of black hopes and the deep anger felt by Blacks with respect to white minority rule in southern Africa. This lack of comprehension no doubt contributed to the rather bizarre and inaccurate judgments contained in NSSM 39: -While the study group could not decide whether racial "violence" would escalate, some members argued that only the growth of violence would bring about change of any kind. But the predominant view, distilled in Option 2, declared that violence would not get the Blacks any political rights.
Not only did the State Department refuse to see the possi bility of a Portuguese collapse in Mozambique, it steadfastly refused public!y to recognize the reality of PAIGC success in Guinea-Bissau. Until the very end, it kept insisting that this most successful of the liberation groups controlled only one third of the territory and that a virtually non-existent rival, FLIC, was a contender for power. In 1973, Kissinger had an opportunity to meet Amilcar Cabral, but NSC staff refused to consider such a meeting on grounds that it would give offence to the Portuguese.
-The study does not perceive that the success of the liberation movements might bring tangible benefits to the African people in their movement for growth and self development. On the contrary, only great power interests are considered. Either the U.S. and its Western European economic partners or rivals, including South Africa, will benefit from and have influence in black states, or the ISSUE: A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion communist bloc will. Africans remain pawns in the cold war game.
-Option 2 is built on the cynical calculation that black states are easily bought off. The token nature of the increase in U.S. economic assistance (an additional $5 million) was admitted to be too small to be capable of exerting any real leverage. But it was intended to protect U.S. interests in the white states by defusing black militancy with some cheap window dressing.
Aid to Zambia was not to include any defensive weapons, whether sophisticated or unsophisticated, notwithstanding the repeated threats of Rhodesia and South Africa to retaliate against Zambian protection of liberation movements.
-NSSM 39 never confronts the question of how "progress toward majority rule" is actually transformed into majority rule. In fact, the document's silence on that issue amounts to an admission that Whites will never peacefully surrender more than a qualified franchise. Yet the drafters of this study do not consider any real support for strong measures, even though these might be the only effective means of bringing about real change.
-South Africa's Bantustans are viewed as unworkable not because of any inherent inequity in allocating 13 percent of South Africa's land as "homelands" for 70 percent of its popu lation, nor because they are areas devoid of resources and without access via the sea to the outside world. They are viewed as unworkable because South Africa has not invested properly in them.
These misjudgments flow from the same basic political posture which governed U.S. domestic policy on race in the Nixon era. The issue is defined as "discrimination" by Whites against Blacks and not in terms of the need for a restructuring of power arrangements.
The United States was prepared during the Nixon era to put down violence in the streets or on the campus with police power, surveillance, and subversion of radical groups, to promulgate an ideology of order and law, to offer token financial remedies and popular "participation" by "responsi ble" native elites through local advisory councils, community action programs and the like. While it may be argued that some of the programs at least assisted in organizing the poor and the discriminated against, no programs were assured any real and continued access to material and technical resources or to important political power. Decision-making was reserved for the already powerful.
This analysis, of course, does not preclude the realism which recognizes the advent of new political power when violence succeeds. Now that FRELIMO has won power in Mozambique, U.S. policymakers have done a complete turnabout, switching from denying FRELIMO's importance and reaiity to promulgating effusive statements of congratula tions and offers of assistance. Economic aid will follow: indeed, it has already been appropriated in a minor amount, since aid can provide some leveraqe to prevent independent Mozambique from taking political steps unacceptable to the U.S. (such as breaking its economic dependence on South Africa or making itself available as a staging ground for guerrilla raids or war on South Africa).
The advent of Gerald Ford has not meant a perceptible change of direction in U.S. policy toward Africa. On the contrary, Secretary Kissinger's strategy is more firmly fixed than before since Ford does not pretend to have Nixon's knowledge of foreign affairs. The U.S. effort to balance its closer alliance with the white regimes by defusing black hostili ties and obviating militant measures goes on at an accelerated pace. Recent events indicate, if anything, a hardening of the U.S. position.
Press reports credit Donald Easum, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, with helping to pave the way for recent top level discussions in Lusaka between leaders of southern Africa's white and black states. Rumors persist that Kenneth Kaunda, Julius Nyerere, and John Vorster have agreed to a detente scheme through which Rhodesia would peacefully move to majority rule in five years, Namibia would receive a carefully safeguarded opportunity for self-determination under at least formal UN auspices, and South Africa would show a willingness to "moderate" its own apartheid system. This arrangement bears a remarkable resemblance to the "progress toward majority rule" outlined in NSSM 39 as the goal of U.S. policy in 1969. The exclusions in the detente arrangement are as significant as the inclusions. NSSM 39 never anticipated self-determination in South Africa, and now Vorster continues to make it clear that he has no 'ntention of allowing substan tive changes in apartheid.
Several straws in the wind indicate that Kissinger senses that, having achieved political success with the black states, the U.S. is now free to move toward a harder line to protect and promote U.S. "tangible" interests in the white states.
After less than a year in office, Easum is being relieved of his post. He is reportedly out of favor because of his sympathy for a moderate southern Africa policy. At the end of his recent trip to southern Africa, he publicly stated his conviction that black states were at least as interested in liberation for southern Africa as they were in their own internal economic development. Kissinger has replaced Easum with Nathaniel Davis, whose lack of African experience may make him more sensitive than Easum to U.S. interests. One-time Ambassador to Chile, Davis is credited with having implemented the "desta bilization" program which helped to overthrow Allende. Another veteran of Kissinger's Chile policy, Dean Hinton, has already been named Ambassador to Zaire, whose size, mineral wealth, and political centrality make it a key to developments in neighboring states: Angola. Zambia, and Tanzania. (Hinton was in charge of AID in Chile.1
8 )
The U.S. veto of the African initiative to exclude South Africa from the UN and Ambassador Scali's denunciation of the UN General Assembly for "unrealistic" resolutions coin cided with the gradual collapse of the Administration's support for repeal of the sanctions-breaking Byrd Amendment. These events suggest a trend to dismiss the concerns of the black states and to move toward a more open and forthright promotion of U.S. tangible interests in the white-ruled states of southern Africa.
Volume IV, Number 3, Fall 1974 This trend reflects not only the rising tide of U.S. economic activity in the white states, but also, perhaps, a raised 6ssess ment of the strategic importance of South Africa. The Pentagon has convinced a growing number in Congress that the Cape route is vital to the solution of our energy problems and that the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and its air surveillance of the Atlantic from Conakry pose threats to U.S. security interests. There are signs that NATO is increasing its interest and contingency planning to include the southern hemisphere, particularly southern Africa. A South African communications base on the Cape exchanges information with the U.S. military on air and ship movements. Now that the British have announced that they intend to pull out of the Simonstown Agreement, the U.S. may decide to fill the vacuum, although France is perhaps a more logical candidate. Clearly, if Mozambican and Angolan ports become unavailable, U.S. destroyers will refuel in South African ports even if this means no liberty on shore for the crew. Further, the growth of the U.S. base on Diego Garcia is bound to strengthen the argument for using South African logistical services in support of the base.
At the same time, as the price of materials and energy increases, the perceived importance of the minerals mined in the white states by cheap labor will also grow. Chrome, ferro chrome, copper, uranium, nickel, and coal (capable of transformation into liquid fuel) are all in abundant supply in South Africa and Rhodesia. U.S. capital investment in these areas of mineral extraction has grown very rapidly in the last five years, far more than in manufacturing.
This analysis does not mean that the U.S. is prepared to intervene militarily on the white side, although it might move to supply South Africa with weapons for "common defense" such as patrol aircraft and anti-submarine warfare equipment. South Africa is much closer to military self-sufficiency now than she was in 1960. Her deficiencies lie primarily in the realm of manpower and political connections and standing. The U.S. cannot supply the former without unacceptable political cost, but the latter we can and have supplied.
NSSM 39 not only built the case for acceptance of South Africa's power and resources; it moves a giant step toward acceptance of the permanence of apartheid itself. It banks on the continuation of the flow of material benefits from the inequities of white oppression. Idolatry of the "tangible" and "realistic" are apparent on every page. Racial discrimination is viewed as a problem in the United States not because it is evil but because Blacks are prepared to cause trouble. By appeasing the black states and urging modest improvements on the white states, policymakers hoped in 1969 to strike a delicate balance between pursuit of gain and the appearance of rectitude. At the moment, the balance seems to have been achieved.
What the study ignores is the longer sweep of history, which is ultimately determined by the deeper currents of the human and political struggle. The Bicentennial of the American Revolution reminds us that we have preferred the liberty to pursue individual self-interests, no matter how grossly material, to the preservation of equality for all. This preference for freedom over equality has led to the concen tration of economic and political power in the hands of the few. But while we have sacrificed our ideals of equality, we have never entirely forgotten them. Indeed we cannot. They will return to haunt us if the policy of the United States continues to dictate the pursuit of power and wealth as ends in themselves.
